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Can Flashbots Prevent All Forms of MEV, or Only Front-Running?

Flashbots is primarily designed to mitigate malicious MEV, such as front-running and sandwich attacks, by privatizing the transaction submission process. It does not eliminate all forms of MEV.

For example, arbitrage MEV, where searchers profit from price differences between decentralized exchanges, is still a beneficial and necessary form of MEV that Flashbots facilitates through its auction. The goal is to redistribute the value of MEV from malicious actors (who hurt users) to validators (who secure the network) and to ensure fair execution for users.

How Does the Implementation of ‘Proposer-Builder Separation’ (PBS) Relate to Flashbots?
What Is a ‘MEV-Share’ Protocol and How Does It Redistribute MEV?
Does Slippage Tolerance Prevent Front-Running or Just Mitigate Its Financial Impact?
What Is the Primary Service Provided by Flashbots to Mitigate MEV?