How Can a Decentralized Exchange (DEX) Design Its Transaction Mechanism to Resist Sandwich Attacks?

DEXs can implement mechanisms like batch auctions, similar to CEXs, to execute all transactions submitted within a time window at a single price. Another method is using time-locked transactions or commitment schemes, where the transaction details are hidden until the execution time.

This removes the front-runner's ability to observe the pending order and submit a profitable transaction before it.

Are There Alternatives to Commit-Reveal Schemes for Preventing MEV?
What Technical Measures Can a User Take to Prevent Being a Victim of a Sandwich Attack?
What Is the Primary Difference between Traditional Market Front-Running and ‘Sandwich Attacks’ in DeFi?
What Are “Sandwich Attacks” and How Do They Relate to DEX Front-Running?
How Do Batch Auctions Differ from Continuous Limit Order Books in Trade Execution?
What Is the Primary Function of a Matching Engine in a Crypto Exchange and How Can Its Design Prevent Front-Running?
What Is the Role of ‘Gas Price Auctions’ in Facilitating Sandwich Attacks?
How Do Frequent Batch Auctions Work to Prevent High-Frequency Trading Advantages?

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