How Do Different DEX Architectures (E.g. AMM Vs. Order Book) Affect Front-Running Vulnerability? ⎊ Path

How Do Different DEX Architectures (E.g. AMM Vs. Order Book) Affect Front-Running Vulnerability?

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are highly vulnerable to front-running, especially sandwich attacks, because the transaction's price impact is predictable based on the fixed formula and liquidity pool size. On-chain Order Book DEXs, while resembling CEXs, are less vulnerable to sandwich attacks but still susceptible to MEV front-running based on transaction ordering.

Off-chain order book models (like those using a relayer) reduce MEV by moving order matching off-chain, making transaction details private until execution.

Why Is a CEX Order Book Susceptible to Insider Trading Rather than External Front-Running?

How Does the “Front-Running” Issue Manifest Differently in AMMs versus CLOBs?

Can a Hybrid DEX Model Eliminate MEV Completely?

How Does the Risk of “Front-Running” Differ between LOBs and AMMs?

What Are the Key Differences between a Constant Product AMM and a Dynamic Order Book?

What Is “Miner Extractable Value” (MEV) and How Is It Related to Front-Running?

How Does an Off-Chain Relayer Model Manage the Security Risk of Centralized Matching?

How Does “Maximal Extractable Value” (MEV) Relate to Front-Running in DEX Transactions?