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How Do Different DEX Architectures (E.g. AMM Vs. Order Book) Affect Front-Running Vulnerability?

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are highly vulnerable to front-running, especially sandwich attacks, because the transaction's price impact is predictable based on the fixed formula and liquidity pool size. On-chain Order Book DEXs, while resembling CEXs, are less vulnerable to sandwich attacks but still susceptible to MEV front-running based on transaction ordering.

Off-chain order book models (like those using a relayer) reduce MEV by moving order matching off-chain, making transaction details private until execution.

How Do Centralized Exchanges (CEXs) Manage Slippage Differently than AMMs?
What Mechanism on a DEX Makes It Vulnerable to Price Manipulation via Sandwich Attacks?
How Do MEV-boost Auctions Attempt to Democratize Access to MEV?
Why Is a CEX Order Book Susceptible to Insider Trading Rather than External Front-Running?