How Does a ‘Slashing’ Mechanism Deter Malicious PoS Re-Orgs?

Slashing is a mechanism where validators who sign conflicting blocks or participate in malicious re-org attempts have a portion of their staked capital permanently destroyed (slashed). This economic penalty makes the cost of a malicious re-org prohibitively high, directly aligning the validator's economic incentive with honest behavior and chain security.

What Is the Concept of ‘Economic Finality’ in PoS Systems?
How Does ‘Slashing’ Work in a Proof-of-Stake System?
What Is ‘Slashing’ in the Context of Proof-of-Stake?
What Is “Slashing” and How Does It Deter Malicious Behavior in PoS?
How Does a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) System Deter a 51% Attack?
What Is “Slashing” and Its Role in Sybil Resistance?
How Does “Slashing” Mitigate the “Nothing at Stake” Problem?
How Does the Threat of Slashing Contribute to the “Cost of Attack” on Ethereum?

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