How Does PPLNS Effectively Deter Miners from "Pool Hopping" or Short-Term Mining? ⎊ Path

How Does PPLNS Effectively Deter Miners from “Pool Hopping” or Short-Term Mining?

PPLNS deters pool hopping because a miner's payout is based on the shares submitted over a moving window of the last N shares. A miner who quickly joins and leaves (hops) will have submitted a high proportion of shares in a round but will only be paid a small fraction of the next block's reward, as their shares will quickly fall out of the PPLNS window.

This reduces the incentive for short-term, opportunistic mining.

What Is the Trade-off between Using a Short TWAP Window versus a Long TWAP Window?

What Does ‘N’ Represent in the PPLNS Fee Structure?

How Does the ‘N’ Value in PPLNS Affect the Pool’s Payout Stability?

How Does the PPLNS Method Distribute the Pool’s Luck Variance between the Operator and the Miners?

What Is “Pool Hopping” and How Do PPLNS Schemes Mitigate It?

Are There Hybrid Payment Methods like Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS) and How Do They Work?

What Is the Difference between PPS and PPLNS Mining Pool Reward Systems?

What Is ‘Pool Hopping’ and Why Do Miners Engage in It?