How Does the Choice of a Mining Pool Affect a Miner’s Exposure to Selfish Mining?

If a miner joins a pool that is large enough to execute a selfish mining attack, they are inadvertently participating in the attack, whether they are aware of the strategy or not. Conversely, if a miner is part of a small, honest pool, they are more likely to have their blocks orphaned by a large selfish pool, thus losing revenue.

Therefore, joining a very large pool carries the risk of centralization, while joining a very small pool carries the risk of being a victim.

What Is a “Sandwich Attack” in the Context of DeFi and How Does It Utilize Front-Running?
What Is the Relationship between the Staking Participation Rate and the Network’s Security Budget?
What Is the Concept of “Selfish Mining” and How Does It Differ from a 51% Attack?
Can a Selfish Mining Strategy Evolve into a 51% Attack?
What Is a “Sandwich Attack” and How Does It Exploit the AMM Structure?
How Does the Block Propagation Delay Factor into the Success of a Selfish Mining Strategy?
What Is ‘Sandwiching’ in the Context of Decentralized Exchange (DEX) Front-Running?
How Does the ‘Longest Chain Rule’ in Proof-of-Work Facilitate the Selfish Mining Attack?

Glossar