How Does the Design of a DEX Prevent Front-Running in Large Trades?

Some DEX designs, like those using batch auctions or a Frequent Batch Auction (FBA) mechanism, mitigate front-running. These systems collect all trades over a short period and execute them simultaneously at a single clearing price, eliminating the deterministic ordering of transactions that front-runners rely on to gain an advantage.

What Is the Concept of a “Clearing Price” in a Batch Auction System?
What Is a ‘Batch Auction’ and How Does It Determine Price?
What Is Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) and How Is It Related to Front-Running?
Can Layer 2 Scaling Solutions Inherently Reduce the Opportunity for MEV Front-Running?
Why Is Transaction Ordering a Greater Challenge for Front-Running on a DEX than a CEX?
How Can a Decentralized Exchange (DEX) Design Its Transaction Mechanism to Resist Sandwich Attacks?
How Do Batch Auctions Eliminate the Transaction Ordering Advantage?
How Do Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) Try to Prevent Sandwich Attacks at the Protocol Level?

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