How Is “Sybil Resistance” Maintained within a Decentralized Oracle Network?

Sybil resistance prevents a single malicious entity from operating multiple nodes to dominate the data feed. DONs achieve this primarily through economic incentives like staking.

Node operators must lock up a significant amount of the network's native token. If they provide dishonest data, their staked tokens are penalized, or "slashed." This financial cost makes it economically prohibitive to launch a Sybil attack.

How Does a Reputation System Contribute to Sybil Resistance in an Oracle Network?
What Is ‘Sybil Resistance’ in the Context of a DON?
How Does Cryptoeconomics Align the Incentives of Oracle Node Operators?
What Is a Common Method for Sybil Resistance besides Quadratic Voting in DAOs?
What Is the Staking Mechanism for Node Operators in a DON?
How Does a ‘Permissioned Blockchain’ Differ in Sybil Resistance?
What Is the Minimum Stake Requirement and How Does It Relate to the Cost of an Attack?
How Does Staking by Node Operators Secure a Decentralized Oracle Network?

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