What Is the Theoretical Upper Bound for the Selfish Mining Profitability Threshold?
The theoretical upper bound for the hashrate required for selfish mining to be profitable is often cited as 33.3%, or one-third of the total network hashrate. At this point, the selfish miner can always guarantee that their chain will win against the honest network's chain in the long run, even under ideal network conditions with zero latency.
If the hashrate exceeds 33.3%, the advantage becomes more pronounced, but the 25% to 33.3% range is the critical zone.
Glossar
Threshold
Barrier ⎊ A threshold, within cryptocurrency derivatives and options trading, fundamentally represents a price level that must be breached for a contract to become active or trigger a specific outcome.
Selfish
Exploitation ⎊ In cryptocurrency derivatives and options trading, "selfish" denotes a strategic, albeit controversial, behavior primarily observed in Bitcoin mining.
Theoretical Upper Bound
Bound ⎊ The theoretical upper bound, within the context of cryptocurrency derivatives, options trading, and financial derivatives, represents the maximum possible value achievable under a specific set of assumptions and constraints.
Upper Bound
Barrier ⎊ In the context of options, this represents a price level that, if breached by the underlying cryptocurrency, can fundamentally alter the option's payoff structure, often leading to early expiration or cash settlement.
Selfish Mining
Block ⎊ The concept of selfish mining, initially observed within the Bitcoin protocol, describes a strategic deviation from standard proof-of-work consensus mechanisms.