Why Is the Cost of Re-Mining an Entire Chain Prohibitive for an Attacker?

The cost is prohibitive due to the exponential increase in required computational work. To reverse a transaction buried under 'N' blocks, an attacker must re-mine all 'N' blocks faster than the honest network can mine new blocks.

This requires significantly more than 51% of the network's hash rate for a sustained period. The immense electricity and hardware rental costs for such a sustained effort quickly surpass any potential profit, especially for high-hash-rate networks.

The sheer scale of the computational race makes it unfeasible.

How Do Major Hashrate Rental Platforms like NiceHash Contribute to the Attack Cost Calculation?
How Does the High Energy Cost of PoW Create a Potential Single Point of Failure (Energy Grid)?
How Do Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Consensus Mechanisms Mitigate the Risks Associated with Hashrate Rental Markets?
How Does the Concept of ‘Time Value of Money’ Apply to an Attacker’s Cost of a Prolonged 51% Attack?
What Is the Risk to the Renter in a Hashrate Rental Agreement?
What Risks Does a Market Maker Face When Their Win Rate Is Too High?
Can a TWAP Feed Be Manipulated over a Long Period?
How Is the Energy Consumption of a Mining Operation Related to Its Hash Rate?